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Abstract
This paper focuses on Byzantine attack detection for Gaussian two-way relay network. In this network, two source nodes
communicate with each other with the help of an amplify-and-forward relay which may perform Byzantine attacks by forwarding
altered symbols to the sources. For simple investigating the detectability of attacks conducted in Gaussian channels, we focus on the
MA channel of the network, while assuming the BC channel is noiseless. Upon such model, we propose a attack detection scheme
implemented in the sources. Specifically, we consider a open wireless propagation environment that allows the symbols, forwarded
by the relay, to go through a continuous channel and arrive to the sources. With the observations of the source, we develop a
detection scheme for the source by comparing the joint empirical distribution of its received and transmitted signals with the known
channel statistics. The main contribution of this paper is to prove that if and only if the Gaussian relay network satisfies a non-
manipulable channel condition, the proposed detection scheme can detect arbitrary attacks that allows the stochastic distributions
of altered symbols to vary arbitrarily and depend on each other. No pre-shared secret or secret transmission is needed for the
detection. Furthermore, we also prove that for the considered Gaussian two-way relay networks, the non-manipulable channel
condition is always satisfied. This result indicates that arbitrary attacks conducted in MA Gaussian channels are detectable by
only using observations, while providing a base for attack detection in more general Gaussian networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Relay nodes are widely employed in modern communication networks to enhance coverage and connectivity of the networks.
This dependence on the relaying infrastructure may increase the risk on security as malicious relays may forward false
information in order to deceive the intended participants into accepting counterfeit information. These attacks, referred to as
Byzantine attacks, impose significant ramifications on the design of network protocols [1][2]. With the presence of Byzantine
attacks, the attack detection technique, which determines whether Byzantine attacks are conducted or not, is one of the key
steps supporting secure communication.
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2The work on attack detection starts above physical-layer, where each link is treated as a unit-capacity bit-pipe, while specific
physical-layer characteristics are shielded. Based on this setting, cryptography keys are often used to make attacks detectable
[3], [4], while requiring the cryptographic keys, to which the relays are not privy, to be shared between the source and
destination before the communication takes place. Without using cryptography keys, information theoretic detection schemes
are proposed for multicast system or Caterpillar Network [5], [6]. These schemes are able to achieve errorless performance in
probability, yet assuming that at least one relay or link is absolutely trustworthy.
Besides these schemes treating channels as noiseless bit-pipes, there are also many other attack detection schemes designed
according to specific characteristics of physical-layer channel for varying application scenarios. These schemes are mainly
enabled by utilizing tracing symbols, or self-information provided by network topology structure. In particular, source node
inserts tracing symbols into a sequence of information bits, and then sends them together to the destination. After tracing symbols
go through the relay channel, degraded by channel fading, noise, and possible attacks, they are observed by the destination.
Relying on the priori knowledge of tracing symbols, the destination could get the stochastic probability distributions of its
observation on the tracing symbols, respectively under conditions that the relay is reliable or malicious. On the basis of the two
conditional statistical distributions, applying theory of hypothesis test, attack detection schemes can be derived with perfect
CSI [7], [8] or no need of CSI [9], [10] for varying network scenarios . The tracing-symbol based schemes commonly assume
that the value and insertion location of the tracing symbols are known only at the source and the destination, which indeed
requires a additional tracing-symbol distribution mechanism implemented between communication parties. Besides that, since
the explicit conditional statistical distributions are needed, these schemes assume that each malicious relay garbles its received
symbols according to independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) stochastic distributions. This model of i.i.d. attacks may not
always be valid in practice, although it makes analysis simple. The Byzantine attack detection methods presented in [7]-[10]
may no longer be provably unbreakable for non-i.i.d. attacks.
Notice that all the above-mentioned schemes detect attacks by inserting redundancy, which increases the overhead cost.
In contrast, the schemes, which utilize side information (SI), do not need to insert any redundancy or just insert negligible
redundancy. To be more specific, in [11], for a wireless OFDMA network, source node detects attacks from the correlation
between its overheard signals from the relay and its transmitted signals. In [12], for the detection implemented in the destination
of wireless one-way network, perfect error correction codes (ECCs) are assumed to be used in the direct link between source
and destination and the relay link. With the help of using ECC in the direct link and relay link, the destination has opportunity
to observe the exact information that are transmitted by the source or the relay. Then, the detection can be done by comparing
the observations from the two links. The detection performance of [11] and [12] are impacted by channel fading, especially,
3the performance of [12] depends on the the quality of direct link, such that it may not work well in the network where direct
link does not exist or suffers deep fading.
On the contrary, [13]-[17] could probabilistically detect attacks. To be more specific, [13]-[16] consider two-hop com-
munication for the typical three-node network composing of an pair of communication parties and an signal one potential
malicious relay, which is possible to conduct arbitrary attacks. To elaborate a little further, the scheme of [13] requires the
communication parties to transmit signal to relay simultaneously so as to support secret transmission, with which some key
components of algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) code could be shared between communication parties, while keeping
confidential to the relay. Then, Byzantine attacks are detectable by applying AMD code to encrypt informations bits. Even the
AMD encryption cost negligible redundancy, the secret transmission increases the overhead cost of the system. This scheme is
difficult to extend this scheme to non-Gaussian channels. In our previous work [14]-[16], focusing on two-way relay system,
we show that for discrete memoryless channels (DMCs), it is possible to detect potential Byzantine attacks dispensing any
AMD code or cryptographic keys. The basic idea is that each node utilizes its own transmitted symbols as clean reference for
statistically checking against the other node’s symbols forwarded by the relay. This scheme is difficult to extend beyond DMC
channels. We also extend the scheme of [14]-[16] to the DMC two-hop relay system composing of a pair of communication
parties and two potential malicious relays, where the all observations of the destination are prone to be attacked [17]. No clean
reference is available for the destination. This work relaxed the restriction imposed on the relay’s misbehavior beyond i.i.d
attacks for the DMC two-hop relay system. However, due to the lack of clean reference in DMC two-hop relay system, we
cannot properly protect communication parties against arbitrary attacks. It indicates if all the signals observed by the destination
are unsecured, the malicious relay have opportunity to fool the destination, which advocates the necessary of clean reference
in attack detection.
This paper focuses on Byzantine attack detection for Gaussian two-way relay network. In two hops, two source nodes
communicate with each other with the help of an amplify-and-forward relay which may perform Byzantine attacks by forwarding
altered symbols to the sources. For simple investigating the detectability of attacks conducted in Gaussian channels, we focus on
the MA channel of the network, while assuming the BC channel is noiseless. The goal of this paper is to make communication
parties probabilistically detect arbitrary attacks, despite of i.i.d or non-i.i.d attacks, without using any AMD code or secret
transmission. In particular, notice that the source nodes’ transmitted signals are not attacked and statistic related to its observation
in the BC phase, then we propose a detection method that use the transmitted signals as clean reference to statistically checking
against the signals observed from the relay. This model and method may seem a little bit similar to our previous work [14]-[16].
It is worth noting that in the Gaussian channel, the observations are continuous signals, the possible attacks are also continuous
4in the sense that they are likely to be conducted within continuous alphabet. It is considerable difference with our previous
work that are applicable for discrete alphabets [14]-[16]. For the continuous attacks and channel model, the core contribution
of this manuscript is to prove that the detectability of continuous attacks is equivalent to non-manipulability of continuous
channels. Also, we prove the considered Gaussian channel satisfies the non-manipulable condition. This result indicates that
arbitrary attacks conducted in MA Gaussian channels are detectable by only using observations, while providing a base for
attack detection in more general Gaussian networks.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Let us focus on the two-way relay example, where the two source nodes are time and phase synchronized. The two source
nodes are termed as source 1 and source 2, respectively. The two sources exchange information with each other during two
stages. Each stage includes n instant. In the first n instants, source 1 and source 2 respectively sends n-length sequences
Xn1 and Xn2 to the relay node. X1 and X2 are equiprobability binary symbols generated from alphabet (+1,−1). The MAC
channel from the two sources to the relay is specified by U = X1 +X2 + Nr, where U is the received signal of the relay
in each instant, Nr is AWGN existed in the MAC channel. Secondly, in the instants n + 1, n + 2, . . . , 2n, the the relay
forwarded V n to the two sources. Through a noiseless broadcast channel, source 1 receives sequence Y n1 = V n. Nr is
random variable following continuous stochastic distribution. Without loss of generalization, we assume the PDF of Nr is
fNr (x) =
1√
2pi
exp
(
−x2
)
. Upon this assumption, the pdf of U conditioned on X1 = 1 and X1 = −1 can be given as
fU|−1 (x) = 0.5√2pi exp
(
−(x+ 2)
2
)
+ 0.5√
2pi
exp
(
−x2
)
and fU|+1 (x) = 0.5√2pi exp
(
−(x− 2)
2
)
+ 0.5√
2pi
exp
(
−x2
)
. Then, the
CDF of U given X1 = x1 is FU|x1 (t |x1 ) =
∫ t
−∞ fU|x1 (u |x1 ) du.
Let us assume Xn1 and Xn2 are i.i.d sequences and both MAC channel and BC channel are memoryless. Hence, Un, Nnr
are both i.i.d sequences. Vn is the forwarded sequences. In this paper, the relay is allowed to conduct arbitrary attack, Then,
the stochastic distribution of Vn depends on the relay’s behavior. In order to define the relay’s behavior in mathematic sense,
let us choose one n′-length sequence u˜1, u˜2, . . . , u˜n′ . Correspondingly, B (u˜j) are domain consisting of u˜j . They satisfy the
constraints as follows.
α1 = u˜1 < u˜2 < u˜3 . . . < u˜n′−1 = β1, β1 < u˜n′
u˜j − u˜j−1 =
β1 − α1
n′ − 2
, j = 2, 3, . . . , n′ − 1
5B (u˜j) =

(u˜j−1, u˜j ] , j = 2, 3, . . . , n′ − 1
(−∞, α1] , j = 1
(β1, +∞) , j = n
′
where α1 and β1 are assumed to depend on n′. We will prove later that there exist a setup method to make α1, β1 and n′
have the following properties.
lim
n′→∞
FU|x1 (α1 |x1 ) = 0, lim
n′→∞
FU|x1 (β1 |x1 ) = 1, lim
n′→∞
β1 − α1
n′ − 2
= 0. (1)
Based on the definition of B (u˜j), the continuous variable U can be quantized to discrete U˜ . In particular, if U ∈ B (u˜j),
then U˜ = u˜j . In other words, U˜ ,
∑n′
j=1 1 (U ∈ B (u˜j)) u˜j . For the random variable U˜ , we use U˜ to denote its alphabet. Also,
we use u˜i denote the generic symbol over U˜ in the i-th instant. From these notations, the function F (n
′)
V n|U˜n
(t |u) for sequence
pair (Un, V n) is defined as
F
(n′)
V n|U˜n
(t |u ) =

∑n
i=1 1i(vi≤t)1i(u˜i=u˜j)
N(u˜j|U˜n )
, N
(
u˜j
∣∣∣U˜n) 6= 0, u ∈ B (u˜j)
0, otherwise
(2)
By replacing U and V with their lower cases, the similar definition can be applied to F (n
′)
vn|u˜n (t |u ), which is definite function as-
sociated with particular sequence (un, vn). If the relay is absolutely reliable, we must always have∑n′−1
j=1
∑n′
i=1 |F
(n′)
V n|U˜n
(u˜j |u˜i )−
Φ(u˜j − u˜i) | = 0, where
Φ (t) =

1, t ≥ 0
0, otherwise
. (3)
From this intuitively understanding, the malicious relay is defined as follows.
Definition 1. (Malicious Relay) The relay is said to be non-malicious if ∑n′−1j=1 ∑n′i=1 |F (n′)V n|U˜n (u˜j |u˜i ) − Φ (u˜j − u˜i) | → 0
in probability as n and n′ approach to infinity. Otherwise, the relay is considered malicious.
Note that Definition 1 tolerates manipulating only a negligible fraction of symbols by the relays. This relaxation has essentially
no effect on the information rate from the source to the destination across the relays. Definition 1 also tolerates modification
conducted by the relay within a negligible extent. This negligible extent is specified by β1−α1
n′−2 , as
β1−α1
n′−2 → 0, this modification
has essentially no effect on the information reliability from the source to the destination across the relay.
For easy description of the main results on detectability, we give the expression of standard the empirical CDF of vn
conditioned on x1 as
Fn
vn|xn1
(t |x1 ) =
∑n
i=1 1 (vi ≤ t) 1 (x1,i = x1)
N(x1|xn1 )
, t ∈ (−∞,+∞) . (4)
6By replacing v and x1 with their upper cases, random Fn
V n|Xn1
(t |x1 ) is similarly defined.
III. MAIN RESULTS
We first point that the wireless two-way relay channel is non-manipulable.
Proposition 1. Non-manipulability of Wireless Channel The aforementioned channel is non-manipulable, which indicates
there does not exist continuous functions Ψ(v |u ) that satisfies the following three conditions
1) Fixing u, Ψ(v |u ) is a pdf.
2) For arbitrary value of u, ∫ +∞−∞ ∣∣∣∫ t−∞Ψ(v |u ) dv − Φ (t− u)∣∣∣2 dt has a strictly positive lower bound.
3) ∫ +∞
−∞
fU|x1 (u)Ψ (v |u ) du = fU|x1 (v).
Theorem 1. (Maliciousness detectability of wireless relay network) As a beneficial result of the fact that wireless MAC channel
is non-manipulable, there exist a sequence of decision statistics {Dn} simultaneously having the following two properties:
Fix any sufficiently small δ > 0, ǫ > 0, there has sufficiently large n′,
1) limn→∞ Pr
(
Dn > ε(n′, δ)
∣∣∣∑n′−1j=1 ∑n′i=1 |F (n′)V n|U˜n (u˜j |u˜i )− Φ(u˜j − u˜i) | > δ
)
≥ 1−ǫ whenever Pr
(∑n′−1
j=1
∑n′
i=1 |F
(n′)
V n|U˜n
(u˜j |u˜i )−
Φ(u˜j − u˜i) | > δ
)
> 0, where ε(n′, δ) is strictly positive and can be arbitrary small.
2) limn→∞ Pr
(
Dn > µ′(n′, δ)
∣∣∣∑n′−1j=1 ∑n′i=1 |F (n′)V n|U˜n (u˜j |u˜i )−Φ(u˜j − u˜i) | ≤ δ) ≤ ǫ whenever Pr(∑n′−1j=1 ∑n′i=1 |F (n′)V n|U˜n (u˜j |u˜i )−
Φ(u˜j − u˜i) | ≤ δ
)
> 0, where µ′(n′, δ)→ 0 as n′ →∞, δ → 0.
IV. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof: Let us assume the manipulable wireless channel exists, which indicates there at least one i.i.d attack making the
statistical distribution of U conditioned on X1 is equivalent to the statistical distribution of V conditioned on X1. Hence, we
have I (X1;U) = I (X1;V ), where I (·; ·) denotes mutual information between the two input variables. On the other hand,
(X1, U, V ) forms a Markov chain as X1 → U → V . From Data-Processing Inequality, I (X1;U) = I (X1;V ) implies the
Markov chain X1 → V → U is also established. Then, we have
Pr (a < U < b |V = v, X1 = −1) = Pr (a < U < b |V = v, X1 = +1) (5)
It is worth noting that due to the continuity of noise, for arbitrary value of v ∈ (−∞,+∞). both Pr (a < U < b |V = v, X1 = −1)
and Pr (a < U < b |V = v, X1 = +1) are well-defined. Furthermore, in this example U = X1+X2+N , Pr (a < U < b |V = v, X1 = −1)
can be reshaped as
Pr (a < U < b |V = v, X1 = −1) = Pr (a+ 1 < X2 +N < b+ 1 |V = v, X1 = −1) . (6)
7Since X1 is independent with X2 and N , therefore we obtain
Pr (a+ 1 < X2 +N < b+ 1 |V = v, X1 = −1) = Pr (a+ 1 < X2 +N < b+ 1 |V = v ) (7)
which indicates
Pr (a < U < b |V = v, X1 = −1) = Pr (a+ 1 < X2 +N < b+ 1 |V = v ) . (8)
Similarly, we can have
Pr (a < U < b |V = v, X1 = +1) = Pr (a− 1 < X2 +N < b− 1 |V = v ) . (9)
Submitting (8) and (9) into (5), we get
Pr (a+ 1 < X2 +N < b+ 1 |V = v ) = Pr (a− 1 < X2 +N < b − 1 |V = v ) . (10)
then, there has∫ +∞
−∞
Pr (a+ 1 < X2 +N < b+ 1 |V = v ) f (v) dv =
∫ +∞
−∞
Pr (a− 1 < X2 +N < b− 1 |V = v ) f (v) dv (11)
It is not hard to find the two sides of (11) are equivalent to Pr (a+ 1 < X2 +N < b+ 1) and Pr (a− 1 < X2 +N < b− 1),
respectively. Finally, we have
Pr (a+ 1 < X2 +N < b+ 1) = Pr (a− 1 < X2 +N < b − 1) . (12)
In summary, under the assumption that the the channel is manipulable, the equation (12) should be established for arbi-
trary a and b. In other words, if we can find a pair (a, b) for a wireless channel that Pr (a+ 1 < X2 +N < b+ 1) 6=
Pr (a− 1 < X2 +N < b− 1), then the channel is non-manipulable.
Notice that the system model does not consider the noise of the BC channel. Actually, even consider the noisy BC channel,
the wireless network is till non-manipulable. This assertion is proved as follows.
Proposition 2. For random variables Z1, Z2, Z3 Z4, Z5, where Z3 = Z1+Z2, Z5 = Z4+Z2, Z1 and Z4 are both stochastic
independent with Z2, if pdf fZ3|X1 (z3 |x1 ) = fZ5|X1 (z5 |x1 ), then there must have fZ1|X1 (z1 |x1 ) = fZ4|X1 (z4 |x1 ).
Proof: According to the fact that Z3 = Z1 + Z2, where Z1 and Z2 are stochastic independent with each other, then the
characteristic function of Z3 conditioned on X1 = x1 is expressed by
ϕZ3|X1 (t |x1 ) = ϕZ1|X1 (t |x1 )ϕZ2|X1 (t |x1 ) , (13)
where ϕZ3|X1 (t |x1 ), ϕZ1|X1 (t |x1 ) and ϕZ2|X1 (t |x1 ) denote the characteristic functions of Z3, Z2 and Z1 conditioned on
X1 = x1, respectively. Similarly, according to the fact that Z5 = Z4 + Z2, where Z4 and Z2 are stochastic independent with
each other, then the characteristic function of Z5 conditioned on X1 = x1 is expressed by
ϕZ5|X1 (t |x1 ) = ϕZ4|X1 (t |x1 )ϕZ2|X1 (t |x1 ) , (14)
8where ϕZ5|X1 (t |x1 ) and ϕZ4|X1 (t |x1 ) denote the characteristic functions of Z4 and Z2 conditioned on X1 = x1, respectively.
Since fZ3|X1 (z3 |x1 ) = fZ5|X1 (z5 |x1 ), we have
ϕZ3|X1 (t |x1 ) = ϕZ5|X1 (t |x1 ) (15)
Substituting (13) and (14) into (13), we get
ϕZ4|X1 (t |x1 )ϕZ2|X1 (t |x1 ) = ϕZ1|X1 (t |x1 )ϕZ2|X1 (t |x1 ) . (16)
Since ϕZ2|X1 (t |x1 )is characteristic function which always attains strictly non-zero value across t ∈ (−∞,+∞), then we have
ϕZ4|X1 (t |x1 ) = ϕZ1|X1 (t |x1 ) . (17)
From the knowledge that pdf can be uniquely determined by characteristic function, (17) indicates
fZ1|X1 (z1 |x1 ) = fZ4|X1 (z4 |x1 ) . (18)
Let us back to the proof of non-manipulability for the system with noisy BC channels. In such case, the source observes
Y = V +Ns in the BC phase, where Ns denotes the noise of the BC channel. Revisiting Y = V+Ns, based on proof firstly given
in the section, if and only if the relay is absolutely reliable, i.e., U = V , we can get fU|X1 (u |x1 ) = fV |X1 (v |x1 ). Then, consider
that Proposition 2 indicates if and only if fU|X1 (u |x1 ) = fV |X1 (v |x1 ), there exists fU+Ns|X1 (y |x1 ) = fV+Ns|X1 (y |x1 ). We
finally get that if and only if U = V , fU+Ns|X1 (y |x1 ) = fV+Ns|X1 (y |x1 ) holds true. Hence, we have proved the non-
manipulability of the wireless network having noisy BC channel. The above-mentioned proof indicates our work could be
applicable for the wireless network where MA and BC channels are both noisy. For simplicity, we give the detailed proof for
the wireless network where only MA channel is noisy.
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 1: PREPARATIONS
In order to prove one convergence property of F (n
′)
V n|U˜n
(t |u) given later, we also define
△Fi,i′,j,j′ = PXi,Xi′ |Vi,Vi′ ,U˜i,U˜i′
{
x1, x1
∣∣vi ≤ t, vi′ ≤ t′, u˜j , u˜j′ }− PX1|U˜ (x1 |u˜j )PXi′ |Vi,Vi′ ,U˜i,U˜i′ {x1 |vi ≤ t, vi′ ≤ t, u˜j , u˜j′ }
− P
Xi|Vi,Vi′ ,U˜i,U˜i′
{x1 |vi ≤ t, vi′ ≤ t, u˜j , u˜j′ }PX1|U˜ (x1 |u˜j′ ) + PX1|U˜ (x1 |u˜j )PX1|U˜ (x1 |u˜j′ )
where i 6= i′, j, j′ = 1, 2, . . . n′, i, i′ = 1, 2, . . . n. Then, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If we choose α1 = −β1, and
1
n′ − 2
= max{PX1|U (1 |−β1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
ξ1(β1)
, 1− PX1|U (1 |β1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
ξ2(β1)
, PX1|U (−1 |β1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
ξ3(β1)
, 1− PX1|U (−1 |−β1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
ξ4(β1)
}. (19)
9then upon this setup, besides the statement of (1) is ture, there also exist a upper bound for Fi,i′j,j′ across j, j′ = 1, 2, . . . n′,
i, i′ = 1, 2, . . . n, i 6= i′. This upper bound only depends on n′ rather than n. Hence, we denote the upper bound as △Fmax (n′).
△Fmax (n
′) has property that
lim
n′→∞
(β1 − α1)
k
n′Fmax (n′)→ 0 (20)
where k is a bounded integer.
Proof: To that end, we first reshape Fi,i′,j,j′ as
△Fi,i′,j,j′ = PX1,i′ |Vi,Vi′ ,U˜i,U˜i′
{x1 |vi ≤ t, vi′ ≤ t, u˜j , u˜j′ }
(
P
X1,i|Vi,Vi′ ,U˜i,U˜i′
{x1 |vi ≤ t, vi′ ≤ t, u˜j , u˜j′ } − PX1|U˜ (x1 |u˜j )
)
− P
X1|U˜ (x1 |u˜j′ )
(
P
X1,i|Vi,Vi′ ,U˜i,U˜i′
{x1 |vi ≤ t, vi′ ≤ t, u˜j , u˜j′ } − PX1|U˜ (x1 |u˜j )
)
=
(
P
X1,i|Vi,Vi′ ,U˜i,U˜i′
{x1 |vi ≤ t, vi′ ≤ t, u˜j , u˜j′ } − PX1|U˜ (x1 |u˜j )
)(
P
X1,i′ |Vi,Vi′ ,U˜i,U˜i′
{x1 |vi ≤ t, vi′ ≤ t, u˜j , u˜j′ } − PX1|U˜ (x1 |u˜j′ )
)
,
(21)
where the first equality follows Xn1 is i.i.d sequence, X1,i′ is independent on X1,i due to i 6= i′. To bound △Fi,i′j,j′ , we have
P
X1|U˜ (x1 |u˜j ) =
∫
u∈B(u˜j) PX1|U (x1 |u ) fU (u) du∫
u∈B(u˜j) fU (u)du
(22)
which indicates
min
u∈B(u˜j)
PX1|U (x1 |u ) ≤ PX1|U˜ (x1 |u˜j ) ≤ maxu∈B(u˜j)
PX1|U (x1 |u) . (23)
On the other hand, since
P
X1,i|Vi,Vi′ ,U˜i,U˜i′
{x1 |vi ≤ t, vi′ ≤ t, u˜j , u˜j′ } =∫ t
−∞
∫ t
−∞
∫
u∈B(u˜j)
∫
u′∈B(u˜j′ )
PX1|U (x1 |u ) fUi,Ui′ |Vi,Vi′
(u, u′ |v, v′ ) fVi,Vi′ (vi, vi′ ) dudu
′dvdv′∫ t
−∞
∫ t
−∞
∫
u∈B(u˜j)
∫
u′∈B(u˜j′)
f
Ui,Ui′ |Vi,Vi′
(u, u′ |v, v′ ) fVi,Vi′ (vi, vi′) dudu
′dvdv′
we have
min
u∈B(u˜j)
PX1|U (x1 |u ) ≤ PXi|Vi,Vi′ ,U˜i,U˜i′ {x1 |vi ≤ t, vi′ ≤ t, u˜j , u˜j′ } ≤ maxu∈B(u˜j)
PX1|U (x1 |u) (24)
Jointly considering (23) and (24), we have
∣∣∣PX1|U˜ (x1 |u˜j )− PX1,i|Vi,Vi′ ,U˜i,U˜i′ {x1 |vi ≤ t, vi′ ≤ t, u˜j , u˜j′ }∣∣∣ < maxu∈B(u˜j)PX1|U (x1 |u)− minu∈B(u˜j)PX1|U (x1 |u) (25)
Following the similar logic from (23) to (25), we also have∣∣∣PX1,i′ |Vi,Vi′ ,U˜i,U˜i′ {x1 |vi ≤ t, vi′ ≤ t, u˜j , u˜j′ } − PX1|U˜ (x1 |u˜j′ )∣∣∣ ≤ maxu∈B(u˜j′ )PX1|U (x1 |u )− minu∈B(u˜j′)PX1|U (x1 |u ) (26)
Substituting (25) and (26) into (21), we have
|△Fi,i′,j,j′ | <
(
max
u∈B(u˜j)
PX1|U (x1 |u )− min
u∈B(u˜j)
PX1|U (x1 |u )
)(
max
u∈B(u˜j′ )
PX1|U (x1 |u )− min
u∈B(u˜j′)
PX1|U (x1 |u )
)
, (27)
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and
max
j,j′=1,2,...n′,i,i′=1,2,...n,i6=i′
△Fi,i′j,j′ < max
j=1,2,...n′
(
max
u∈B(u˜j)
PX1|U (x1 |u)− min
u∈B(u˜j)
PX1|U (x1 |u )
)2
, △Fmax (n
′) (28)
Then, we proceed to focus on the property of Fmax (n′). Revisiting the system model, we have
PX1|U (1 |u ) =
1
2 + exp (4u− 4) + exp (−4u− 4)
+
1
2 exp (4− 4u) + 1 + exp (−8u)
(29)
and
PX1|U (−1 |u ) =
1
2 + exp (4u− 4) + exp (−4u− 4)
+
1
2 exp (4 + 4u) + 1 + exp (8u)
(30)
According to PX1|U (1 |u ), PX1|U (−1 |u) and (19), we get limn′→∞ β1−α1n′−2 = 0. The statement of (1) is thus proved.
Furthermore, in (19) we have limβ1→∞ (2β1)k+2 ξi (β1) = 0 and limβ1→∞ (2β1)k ξi (β1) = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3, 4.. With these
properties on limitation, for j = 2, 3, . . . , n′ − 1, we have(
max
u∈B(u˜j)
PX1|U (x1 |u )− min
u∈B(u˜j)
PX1|U (x1 |u )
)2
≤ P ′
2
X1|U
(
x1
∣∣u′j )( 2β1
n′ − 2
)2
(31)
where u′j ∈ B (u˜j), P ′X1|U (x1 |u) is derived function of PX1|U (x1 |u). The maximum of P ′X1|U (x1 |u) in (−∞,+∞) is
bounded.
lim
n′→∞
(2β1)
k
n′
(
max
u∈B(u˜j)
PX1|U (x1 |u)− min
u∈B(u˜j)
PX1|U (x1 |u )
)2
≤ lim
n′→∞
(2β1)
k
n′P ′2X1|U
(
x1
∣∣u′j )( 2β1n′ − 2
)2
= lim
β1→∞
P ′2X1|U
(
x1
∣∣u′j ) (2β1)k+2n′ − 2 = 0 (32)
where the last equality follows the fact that the maximum of P ′X1|U (x1 |u ) in (−∞,+∞) is bounded and in (19) we have
limβ1→∞ (2β1)
k+2
ξi (β1) = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Then, for j = 1 and j = n′,(
max
u∈B(u˜j)
PX1|U (x1 |u)− min
u∈B(u˜j)
PX1|U (x1 |u)
)2
≤
(
1
n′ − 2
)2
(33)
Hence, for j = 1 and j = n′, we have
lim
n′→∞
(2β1)
k n′
(
max
u∈B(u˜j)
PX1|U (x1 |u )− min
u∈B(u˜j)
PX1|U (x1 |u )
)2
≤ lim
n′→∞
(2β1)
k n′
(
1
n′ − 2
)2
= lim
β1→∞
(2β1)
k
n′ − 2
= 0 (34)
where the last equality follows in (19) we have limβ1→∞ (2β1)k ξi (β1) = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Combining (32) and (34), we
get for each j = 1, 2, . . . , n′,
lim
n′→∞
(2β1)
k n′
(
max
u∈B(u˜j)
PX1|U (x1 |u )− min
u∈B(u˜j)
PX1|U (x1 |u )
)2
= 0 (35)
Finally, based on the definition of Fmax (n′) in (28), the statement of this lemma is immediate.
Upon this lemma, we have the following convergence property.
Lemma 2. For arbitrary t, sufficiently small µ and ε ≤ µ2n′ ,
Pr
{∣∣∣∣FnV n|Xn1 (t |x1 )−
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X1 (u |x1 )F
(n′)
V n|U˜n
(t |u ) du
∣∣∣∣ > µ}
11
<
4
µ2
n′2
n
+
1
Pr
{(
Xn1 , U˜
n
)
∈ Aε
}
(PX1 (x) − ε)
2
△Fmax
(
n′
)+ Pr{(Xn1 , U˜n) /∈ Tn[X1,U˜]
ε
}
(36)
where
Aε =
(xn1 , u˜n) :
∣∣∣∣∣∣PU˜ |X1 (u˜ |x1 )−
N
(
u˜
∣∣∣U˜n )PX1|U˜ (x1 |u˜ )
N (x1 |Xn1 )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ < ε,
∣∣∣∣PX1 (x1)− N (x1 |Xn1 )n
∣∣∣∣ < ε
 . (37)
Proof: Notice that
Pr
{∣∣∣∣FnV n|Xn1 (t |x1 )−
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X1 (u |x1 )F
(n′)
V n|U˜n
(t |u ) du
∣∣∣∣ > µ} (38)
< Pr
{∣∣∣∣FnV n|Xn1 (t |x1 )−
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X1 (u |x1 )F
(n′)
V n|U˜n
(t |u ) du
∣∣∣∣ > µ ∣∣∣(Xn1 , U˜n) ∈ Aε}+ Pr{(Xn1 , U˜n) /∈ Aε}
The proof of this lemma is equivalent to prove the two items in the right side of (38) both approach to 0. Firstly notice that
after n′, α1 and β1 are chosen and fixed properly,
Pr
{(
Xn1 , U˜
n
)
/∈ Aε
}
→ 0 (39)
as n approaches to infinity. Then, focusing on the first item in the right side of (38),
(
Xn1 , U˜
n
)
∈ Aε indicates N
(
u˜j
∣∣∣U˜n) > 0
for all j = 1, 2, . . . , n′. Hence,
∑
n
i=1 1i(vi≤t)1i(u˜i=u˜j)
N(u˜j|U˜n )
is well-defined for all j = 1, 2, . . . , n′. Under the condition
(
Xn1 , U˜
n
)
∈
Aε, we have ∣∣∣∣FnV n|Xn1 (t |x1 )−
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X1 (u |x1 )F
(n′)
V n|U˜n
(t |u ) du
∣∣∣∣ (40)
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑n
i=1 1i (vi ≤ t) 1i (xi = x1)
N (x1 |Xn1 )
−
n′∑
j=1
∑n
i=1 1i (vi ≤ t) 1i (u˜i = u˜j)
N
(
u˜j
∣∣∣U˜n)
∫
B(u˜j)
fU|X1 (u |x1 ) du
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑n′
j=1
∑n
i=1 1i (vi ≤ t) 1i (xi = x1) 1i (u˜i = u˜j)
N (x1 |Xn1 )
−
n′∑
j=1
∑n
i=1 1i (vi ≤ t) 1i (u˜i = u˜j)
N
(
u˜j
∣∣∣U˜n) PU˜ |X1 (u˜j |x1 )
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Substituting (40) into the first item in the right side of (38), it becomes
Pr

∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑n′
j=1
∑n
i=1 1i (vi ≤ t) 1i (xi = x1) 1i (u˜i = u˜j)
N (x1 |Xn1 )
−
n′∑
j=1
∑n
i=1 1i (vi ≤ t) 1i (u˜i = u˜j)
N
(
u˜j
∣∣∣U˜n ) PU˜|X1 (u˜j |x1 )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > µ
∣∣∣(Xn1 , U˜n) ∈ Aε

(41)
< Pr

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
n′∑
j=1
(∑n
i=1 1i (vi ≤ t) 1i (xi = x1) 1i (u˜i = u˜j)
n (PX1 (x)− ε)
−
∑n
i=1 1i (vi ≤ t) 1i (u˜i = u˜j)PX1|U˜ (x1 |u˜j )
n (PX1 (x)− ε)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Hj
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
>
µ
2
∣∣∣(Xn1 , U˜n) ∈ Aε

+
n′∑
j=1
Pr

∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑n
i=1 1i (vi ≤ t) 1i (u˜i = u˜j)
N
(
u˜j
∣∣∣U˜n ) PU˜|X1 (u˜j |x1 )−
∑n
i=1 1i (vi ≤ t) 1i (u˜i = u˜j)PX1|U˜ (x1 |u˜j )
N (x1 |Xn1 )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > µ2n′
∣∣∣(Xn1 , U˜n) ∈ Aε

The second item in the right of (41) can be further bound as
Pr

∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑n
i=1 1i (vi ≤ t) 1i (u˜i = u˜j)
N
(
u˜j
∣∣∣U˜n ) PU˜|X1 (u˜j |x1 )−
∑n
i=1 1i (vi ≤ t) 1i (u˜i = u˜j)PX1|U˜ (x1 |u˜j )
N (x1 |Xn1 )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > µ2n′
∣∣∣(Xn1 , U˜n) ∈ Aε
 (42)
≤ Pr

∣∣∣∣∣∣PU˜|X1 (u˜j |x1 )−
N
(
u˜
∣∣∣U˜n)PX1|U˜ (x1 |u˜j )
N (x1 |Xn1 )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > µ2n′
∣∣∣(Xn1 , U˜n) ∈ Aε
 = 0
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where the last equality follows the definition of Aε and set of ε ≤ µ2n′ . From (42), the second item in the right of (41) equals
to 0. Then, we proceed to bound the first item in the right of (41) as
Pr

∣∣∣∣∣∣
n′∑
j=1
Hj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > µ2
∣∣∣(Xn1 , U˜n) ∈ Aε
 < 4µ2EAε
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n′∑
j=1
Hj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
4
µ2
n′∑
j=1
n′∑
j′=1
EAε (HjHj′) (43)
which follows the Chebyshev theorem. EAε (·) indicates the expectation of its input conditioned on
(
Xn1 , U˜
n
)
∈ Aε.
EAε (HjHj′) =
EAε
(∑n
i=1 1i (vi ≤ t) 1i (u˜i = u˜j)
(
1i (x1,i = x1)− PX1|U˜ (x1 |u˜j )
))(∑n
i=1 1i (vi ≤ t) 1i (u˜i = u˜j′)
(
1i (x1,i = x1)− PX1|U˜ (x1 |u˜j′ )
))
n2 (PX1 (x)− ε)
2
≤
∑n
i=1 EAε
{
1i (vi ≤ t) 1i (u˜i = u˜j)
(
1i (x1,i = x1)− PX1|U˜ (x1 |u˜j )
)
1i (u˜i = u˜j′)
(
1i (x1,i = x1)− PX1|U˜ (x1 |u˜j′ )
)}
n2 (PX1 (x)− ε)
2
+
E
∑n
i=1
∑n
i=1,i′ 6=i 1i (vi ≤ t) 1i (u˜i = u˜j) 1i′ (vi′ ≤ t) 1i′ (u˜i′ = u˜j′)
(
1i (x1,i = x1)− PX1|U˜ (x1 |u˜j )
)(
1i′ (x1,i′ = x1)− PX1|U˜ (x1 |u˜j′ )
)
Pr
{(
Xn1 , U˜
n
)
∈ Aε
}
n2 (PX1 (x)− ε)
2
≤
1
n
+
∑n
i=1
∑n
i=1,i′ 6=iE {1i (vi ≤ t) 1i (u˜i = u˜j) 1i′ (vi′ ≤ t) 1i′ (u˜i′ = u˜j′) 1i (x1,i = x1) 1i′ (x1,i′ = x1)}
Pr
{(
Xn1 , U˜
n
)
∈ Aε
}
n2 (PX1 (x) − ε)
2
−
∑n
i=1
∑n
i=1,i′ 6=iE {1i (vi ≤ t) 1i (u˜i = u˜j) 1i′ (vi′ ≤ t) 1i′ (u˜i′ = u˜j′) 1i′ (x1,i′ = x1)}PX1|U˜ (x1 |u˜j )
Pr
{(
Xn1 , U˜
n
)
∈ Aε
}
n2 (PX1 (x)− ε)
2
−
∑n
i=1
∑n
i=1,i′ 6=iE {1i (vi ≤ t) 1i (u˜i = u˜j) 1i′ (vi′ ≤ t) 1i′ (u˜i′ = u˜j′) 1i (x1,i = x1)}PX1|U˜ (x1 |u˜j′ )
Pr
{(
Xn1 , U˜
n
)
∈ Aε
}
n2 (PX1 (x) − ε)
2
+
∑n
i=1
∑n
i=1,i′ 6=iE {1i (vi ≤ t) 1i (u˜i = u˜j) 1i′ (vi′ ≤ t) 1i′ (u˜i′ = u˜j′)}PX1|U˜ (x1 |u˜j )PX1|U˜ (x1 |u˜j′ )
Pr
{(
Xn1 , U˜
n
)
∈ Aε
}
n2 (PX1 (x) − ε)
2
=
1
n
+
∑n
i=1
∑n
i=1,i′ 6=i PVi,Vi′ ,U˜i,U˜i′
{vi ≤ t, vi′ ≤ t, u˜j , u˜j}△Fi,i′j,j′
Pr
{(
Xn1 , U˜
n
)
∈ Aε
}
n2 (PX1 (x)− ε)
2
(44)
Substituting (44) into (43), we have
Pr

∣∣∣∣∣∣
n′∑
j=1
Hj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > µ2
∣∣∣(Xn1 , U˜n) ∈ Aε
 < 4µ2
n′∑
j=1
n′∑
j′=1
 1n +
∑n
i=1
∑n
i=1,i′ 6=i PVi,Vi′ ,U˜i,U˜i′
{vi ≤ t, vi′ ≤ t, u˜j , u˜j}
Pr
{(
Xn1 , U˜
n
)
∈ Aε
}
n2 (PX1 (x) − ε)
2
△Fmax
(
n′
)
≤
4
µ2
n′2
n
+
∑n
i=1
∑n
i=1,i′ 6=i
∑n′
j=1
∑n′
j′=1 PU˜ {u˜j}PU˜ {u˜j′}
Pr
{(
Xn1 , U˜
n
)
∈ Aε
}
n2 (PX1 (x)− ε)
2
△Fmax
(
n′
)
≤
4
µ2
n′2
n
+
1
Pr
{(
Xn1 , U˜
n
)
∈ Aε
}
(PX1 (x)− ε)
2
△Fmax
(
n′
) (45)
From (45) (42) (41) and (38), we have
Pr
{∣∣∣∣FnV n|Xn1 (t |x1 )−
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X1 (u |x1 )F
(n′)
V n|U˜n
(t |u) du
∣∣∣∣ > µ}
<
4
µ2
n′2
n
+
1
Pr
{(
Xn1 , U˜
n
)
∈ Aε
}
(PX1 (x)− ε)
2
△Fmax (n
′)
 + Pr{(Xn1 , U˜n) /∈ T n[X1,U˜]
ε
}
(46)
The proof is finished.
Upon the aforementioned lemmas, the following assertion is immediate.
Lemma 3. For sequence t1, t2, . . . , tn′−1, we have
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1) Fix µ to arbitrary small value, there has
lim
n→∞,n′→∞
Pr
β1 − α1n′ − 2
n′−1∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣FnV n|Xn1 (tj |x1 )−
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X1 (u |x1 )F
(n′)
V n|U˜n
(tj |u ) du
∣∣∣∣ > µ
 = 0. (47)
2) Fix n′ to arbitrary large value, and ǫ to arbitrary small value, there has
Pr
β1 − α1n′ − 2
n′−1∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣FnV n|Xn1 (tj |x1 )−
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X1 (u |x1 )F
(n′)
V n|U˜n
(tj |u ) du
∣∣∣∣ > µn′
 ≤ ǫ (48)
where n approaches to infinity, limn′→∞ µn′ = 0.
Proof: For arbitrary small µ, we have
Pr
β1 − α1n′ − 2
n′−1∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣FnV n|Xn1 (tj |x1 )−
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X1 (u |x1 )F
(n′)
V n|U˜n
(tj |u) du
∣∣∣∣ > µ

≤
n′−1∑
j=1
Pr
{∣∣∣∣FnV n|Xn1 (tj |x1 )−
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X1 (u |x1 )F
(n′)
V n|U˜n
(tj |u ) du
∣∣∣∣ > µ(n′ − 2)(β1 − α1)(n′ − 1)
}
≤
4(n′ − 1)2
µ2(n′ − 2)2
n′3 (β1 − α1)2
n
+
(β1 − α1)
2 n′
Pr
{(
Xn1 , U˜
n
)
∈ Aε
}
(PX1 (x)− ε)
2
△Fmax (n
′)
+ n′ Pr{(Xn1 , U˜n) /∈ T n[X1,U˜]
ε
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Θ(µ,n,n′)
where the last inequality follows lemma 2. From lemma 1, limn′→∞ (β1 − α1)2 n′△Fmax (n′) = 0, then we have
lim
n→∞,n′→∞
Θ
(
µ, n, n′
)
= 0 (49)
for arbitrary value of µ. The first statement of this lemma is proved. Furthermore, according to the expression of Θ (µ, n, n′),
Θ (µ, n, n′) < ǫ would be yielded by
4(n′ − 1)2 (β1 − α1)
2
n′△Fmax (n′)
(n′ − 2)2 (PX1 (x)− ε)
2
ǫ1
≤ µ2 (50)
n→∞, ǫ1 < ǫ. Hence, by setting
4(n′ − 1)2 (β1 − α1)
2 n′△Fmax (n′)
(n′ − 2)2 (PX1 (x)− ε)
2
ǫ1
= µ2n′ (51)
the second statement can be proved.
Lemma 4. There exist n0, by which for arbitrary n′ > n0 we have sequence α1 = t1 < t2 < . . . < tn′−1 = β1 making
equation
β1 − α1
n′ − 2
n′−1∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ tj
−∞
fU|X1 (u |x1 ) du−
n′∑
i
P
U˜|X1
(u˜i)wi,j
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
= 0
have single solution that wi,j = Φ(tj − u˜i) , i = 1, . . . n′, j = 1, . . . n′ − 1 in the domain D =
{
wi,j : 0 ≤ wi,1 ≤ wi,2 ≤
. . . wi,n̂ ≤ 1, i = 1, . . . n
′, j = 1, . . . n′ − 1
}
.
Proof: Let us choose ti = u˜j , for j = 1, 2, . . . , n′− 1. Then, the proof follows the logic of the proof that wireless channel
is non-manipulable.
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VI. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Let us go back to the proof of theorem 1. With the aforementioned lemmas, we will show the decision statistic Dn =
1
n′−2
∑n′−1
j=1
∣∣∣∣FnV n|Xn1 (tj |x1 )− ∫ tj−∞ fU|X1 (u |x1 ) du
∣∣∣∣ simultaneously satisfies the properties stated by theorem 1.
From aforementioned work, it is not hard to find many variables, such as α1, β1 and u˜, depend on n′. For easy description, n′
does not appear in these notations. However, the dependency between n′ and these variables will be utilized in the proof given
below. Hence, these notations are written with a superscript n′ or possible value of n′ so as to highlight the dependency on n′. To
be more specific, n′ takes value from sequence n′1, n′2, . . . ,∞, there has
△n′
k
△n′
k−1
= k and
△n′
k
△n′
1
= sk, where △n′
k
=
α
(n′
k
)
1 −β
(n′
k
)
1
n′
k
−2 .
Upon n′, we define function M(n
′)
(
W (n
′)
)
=
β
(n′)
1 −α(n
′)
1
n′−2
∑n′−1
j=1
∣∣∣∫ tj−∞ fU|X1 (u |x1 ) du−∑n′i PU˜ |X1 (u˜(n′)i )w(n′)i,j ∣∣∣2 where
W (n
′) is a matrix variable
[
W (n
′)
]
i,j
= w
(n′)
i,j , i = 1, 2, . . . , n
′
, j = 1, 2, . . . , n′−1. As stated by lemma 4, M(n
′)
(
W (n
′)
)
=
0 has single solution in the point that W (n
′)
0 defined as
[
W
(n′)
0
]
i,j
= Φ
(
t
(n′)
j − u˜
(n′)
i
)
, i = 1, . . . n′, j = 1, . . . n′− 1 in the
domain D(n′) =
{
W (n
′) : 0 ≤ w
(n′)
i,1 ≤ w
(n′)
i,2 ≤ . . . w
(n′)
i,n′−1 ≤ 1, i = 1, . . . n
′}
.
Lemma 5. If n′ is sufficient large and W (n′) ∈ D(n′)s , where D(n′)s = {W (n′) : ∣∣∣W (n′) −W (n′)0 ∣∣∣ ≥ δ, W (n′) ∈ D(n′)}, then
M(n
′)
(
W (n
′)
)
has positive infimum across D(n′)s , denoted as λ(n′) (δ). Moreover, λ(n′) (δ)→ 0, δ → 0.
Proof: Using the assertion given by lemma 4, the proof of this lemma follows our previous work.
Lemma 6. If the wireless channel is non-manipulable, then for arbitrary small δ, there exist sufficient large n0, such that for
any n′ > n0, λ(n
′) (δ) ≥ µn′ .
Proof: First notice that for arbitrary W (n′)f ∈ D(n
′)
, there exist a CDF function F (t |u ) which satisfies
[
W
(n′)
f
]
i,j
=
∫
u∈B
(
u˜
(n′)
i
) F
(
t
(n′)
j |u
)
fU|x (u) du∫
u∈B
(
u˜
(n′)
i
) fU|x (u) du . (52)
Then, according to the condition that
△n′
k
△n′
k−1
= k and
△n′
k
△n′1
= sk, fixing F (t |u ),
∣∣∣W (n′)f −W (n′)0 ∣∣∣ ≥ δ implies ∣∣∣W (n′k)f −W (n′k)0 ∣∣∣ ≥
δ for n′k > n′. For the sake of proof, we define a function set
F =
F (t |u ) : limn′→∞
n′−1∑
j=1
n′∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫
u∈B
(
u˜
(n′)
i
) F
(
t
(n′)
j |u
)
fU|x (u) du∫
u∈B
(
u˜
(n′)
i
) fU|x (u) du − Φ
(
t
(n′)
j − u˜
(n′)
i
)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ δ
 . (53)
Then, we define D˜(n
′)
s as
D˜(n
′)
s =
W (n
′) :
[
W (n
′)
]
i,j
=
∫
u∈B
(
u˜
(n′)
i
) F
(
t
(n′)
j |u
)
fU|x (u) du∫
u∈B
(
u˜
(n′)
i
) fU|x (u) du , F (t |u ) ∈ F
 (54)
Obviously, D(n
′)
s ⊆ D˜
(n′)
s , hence, we get λ(n
′) (δ) ≥ λ˜(n
′) (δ) where λ˜(n′) (δ) is infimum of M(n
′)
(
W (n
′)
)
across D˜
(n′)
s .
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In order to prove λ˜(n′) (δ) > µn′ , for arbitrary F (t |u ) ∈ F , we assume for arbitrary large n′0, there exist n′ > n′0, such
that M(n
′)
(
W
(n′)
f
)
≤ µn′ . In other words, there exist a sequence denoted as n̂1 < n̂2 < . . . ,∞ by which
M (n̂k)
(
W
(n̂k)
f
)
≤ µn̂k (55)
Then, we have
lim
k→∞
M (n̂k)
(
W
(n̂k)
f
)
≤ lim
k→∞
µn̂k = 0 (56)
From the expressions of W (n
′)
f and M(
n′)
(
W (n
′)
)
, we get there is a division manner for t ∈ (−∞,+∞) characterized by
n̂1 < n̂2 < . . . ,∞ such that
lim
k→∞
β
(n̂k)
1 − α
(n̂k)
1
n̂k − 2
n̂k−2∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∫ tj
−∞
fU|X1 (u |x1 ) du−
∫ tj
−∞
fU|X1 (u)F (t |u ) du
∣∣∣∣2 = 0 (57)
On the other hand, from the definition of F and the condition that the wireless channel is non-manipulable, we get∫ t
−∞
fU|X1 (u |x1 ) du 6=
∫ t
−∞
fU|X1 (u)F (t |u ) du (58)
Hence, if
∫∞
−∞
∣∣∣∫ t−∞ fU|X1 (u |x1 ) du− ∫ t−∞ fU|X1 (u)F (t |u) du∣∣∣2 dt can be integrated, we must have∫ ∞
−∞
∣∣∣∣∫ t−∞ fU|X1 (u |x1 ) du−
∫ t
−∞
fU|X1 (u)F (t |u ) du
∣∣∣∣2 dt > 0, (59)
which indicates there is no division manner for t ∈ (−∞,+∞) making (57) be true. It contradicts with the meaning of (57).
We proceed to examine another case that if
∫∞
−∞
|
∫ t
−∞
fU|X1 (u |x1 ) du −
∫ t
−∞
fU|X1 (u)F (t |u ) du|
2dt cannot be integrated,
since
∣∣∣∫ t−∞ fU|X1 (u |x1 ) du− ∫ t−∞ fU|X1 (u)F (t |u ) du∣∣∣ > 0, we have
lim
β→∞,α→−∞
∫ β
α
∣∣∣∣∫ t
−∞
fU|X1 (u |x1 ) du−
∫ t
−∞
fU|X1 (u)F (t |u ) du
∣∣∣∣2 dt =∞ (60)
Hence, there has α′ and β′ by which∫ β′
α′
∣∣∣∣∫ t−∞ fU|X1 (u |x1 ) du−
∫ t
−∞
fU|X1 (u)F (t |u) du
∣∣∣∣2 dt > 0 (61)
Meanwhile, (57) indicates
lim
k→∞
β
(n̂k)
1 − α
(n̂k)
1
n̂k − 2
∑
tj∈[α′,β′]
∣∣∣∣∫ tj−∞ fU|X1 (u |x1 ) du−
∫ tj
−∞
fU|X1 (u)F (t |u) du
∣∣∣∣2 = 0. (62)
However, (61) indicates there is no division manner for t ∈ (α′, β′) making (62) be true. Hence, the contradiction happens. Due
to these contradictions, we attain the assumption that for arbitrary large n′0, there exist n′ > n′0, such that M(n
′)
(
W
(n′)
f
)
≤
µn′ is not right. Therefore, we have there exist n′0, for any n′ > n′0, there has M(n
′)
(
W
(n′)
f
)
> µn′ . Applying the
aforementioned derivation to each function belonging to F , we get there exist n0, for any n′ > n0, M(n
′)
(
W
(n′)
f
)
> µn′
is available for all possible functions of F . Since λ˜(n′) (δ) is infimum of M(n
′)
(
W (n
′)
)
across D˜
(n′)
s , we thus have
λ˜(n
′) > µn′ (63)
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Revisiting λ(n′) (δ) ≥ λ˜(n′) (δ), we get
λ(n
′) (δ) > µn′ (64)
Finally, the proof is completed.
Lemma 7. Fixing arbitrary small ǫ and δ, if there exist n′0 such that
Pr{
n′0−1∑
j=1
n′0∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣F (n′0)V n|U˜n (t(n′0)j ∣∣∣u˜(n′0)i )− Φ(t(n′0)j − u˜(n′0)i )
∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
R(Un,V n,n′0)
> δ} > 0
then, we have for n′ > n′0, Pr {Dn < ε (n′, δ) |R (Un, V n, n′) > δ } is well-defined and
Pr {Dn < ε (n′, δ) |R (Un, V n, n′) > δ } ≤ ǫ
where n→∞, n′ is sufficient large so as to satisfy the properties given by lemma 4 and lemma 6. ε (n′, δ) is strictly positive
and can be arbitrary small value.
Proof: According to lemma 3, there exist µn′ such that
Pr
β(n
′)
1 − α
(n′)
1
n′ − 2
n′−1∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣FnV n|Xn1
(
t
(n′)
j |x1
)
−
n′∑
i
P
U˜|X1
(
u˜
(n′)
i
)
F
(n′)
V n|U˜n
(
t
(n′)
j
∣∣∣u˜(n′)i )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > µn′

≤ ǫPr
{
R
(
Un, V n, n′0
)
> δ
}
≤ ǫPr
{
R
(
Un, V n, n′
)
> δ
}
, (65)
where µn′ → 0 as n′ →∞, n→∞. The last inequality follows the fact that R (Un, V n, n′0) > δ implies R (Un, V n, n′) > δ
according to the definition of F (n
′)
V n|U˜n
(
t
(n′)
j
∣∣∣u˜(n′)i ).
Then, if
β
(n′)
1 − α
(n′)
1
n′ − 2
n′−1∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣FnV n|Xn1
(
t
(n′)
j |x1
)
−
n′∑
i
P
U˜|X1
(
u˜
(n′)
i
)
F
(n′)
V n|U˜n
(
t
(n′)
j
∣∣∣u˜(n′)i )
∣∣∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
G(V n,Un,Xn1 )
< µn′ ,
we must have
(
β
(n′)
1 − α
(n′)
1
)
Dn ≥
β
(n′)
1 − α
(n′)
1
n′ − 2
n′−1∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ t(n′)
j
−∞
fU|X1 (u |x1 ) du−
n′∑
i
P
U˜|X1
(
u˜
(n′)
i
)
F
(n′)
V n|U˜n
(
t
(n′)
j
∣∣∣u˜(n′)i )
∣∣∣∣∣∣− µn′ (66)
≥
β
(n′)
1 − α
(n′)
1
n′ − 2
n′−1∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ t(n′)
j
−∞
fU|X1 (u |x1 ) du−
n′∑
i
P
U˜|X1
(
u˜
(n′)
i
)
F
(n′)
V n|U˜n
(
t
(n′)
j
∣∣∣u˜(n′)i )
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
− µn′
On the other hand, if
n′−1∑
j=1
n′∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣F (n′)V n|U˜n (t(n′)j ∣∣∣u˜(n′)i )− Φ(t(n′)j − u˜(n′)i )
∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
R(Un,V n,n′)
> δ, according to lemma 5, the right side of (66)
becomes (
β
(n′)
1 − α
(n′)
1
)
Dn ≥ λ(n
′) (δ)− µn′ (67)
which can be reshaped as
Dn ≥
λ(n
′) (δ)− µn′(
β
(n′)
1 − α
(n′)
1
) (68)
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Define ε (n′, δ) = λ
(n′)(δ)−µn′(
β
(n′)
1 −α(n
′)
1
) , according to lemma 6, ε (n′, δ) > 0 as n′ is sufficient large. From the properties of µn′ and
λ(n
′) (δ), ε (n′, δ) can be arbitrarily small.
Upon (66), (67) and (68), we have
Pr
{
Dn ≥ ε
(
n′, δ
)
, R
(
Un, V n, n′
)
≥ δ
}
≥ Pr
{
Dn ≥ ε
(
n′, δ
)
, R
(
Un, V n, n′
)
≥ δ,G (V n, Un, Xn1 ) ≤ µ
′}
= Pr
{
R
(
Un, V n, n′
)
≥ δ,G (V n, Un, Xn1 ) ≤ µn′
}
≥ Pr
{
R
(
Un, V n, n′
)
≥ δ
}
− Pr {G (V n, Un, Xn1 ) ≥ µn′}
where the equation follows the logic from (66), (67) to (68). Then, we have
Pr
{
Dn ≥ ε
(
n′, δ
) ∣∣R (Un, V n, n′) ≥ δ} = Pr {Dn ≥ ε (n′, δ) , R (Un, V n, n′) ≥ δ}
Pr {R (Un, V n, n′) ≥ δ}
> 1−
Pr {G (V n, Un, Xn1 ) ≥ µn′}
Pr {R (Un, V n, n′) ≥ δ}
≥ 1− ǫ
(69)
where the last inequality follows (65). The proof is finished.
The first property of theorem 1 is direct result from lemma 7.
We proceed to prove the second property of theorem 1. For arbitrary small δ, µ and µ′(n′, δ) = µ+ δ
n′−2 , we have
Pr
Dn ≤ µ′(n′, δ)⋂
n′−1∑
j=1
n′∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣F (n′)V n|U˜n (t(n′)j ∣∣∣u˜(n′)i )− Φ(t(n′)j − u˜(n′)i )
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ
 ≥
Pr
{
Dn ≤ µ′(n′, δ)
⋂ 1
n′ − 2
n′−1∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣FnV n|Xn1 (t(n′)j |x1 )−
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X1 (u |x1 )F
(n′)
V n|U˜n
(
t
(n′)
j |u
)
du
∣∣∣∣ ≤ µ
⋂ n′−1∑
j=1
n′∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣F (n′)V n|U˜n (t(n′)j ∣∣∣u˜(n′)i )− Φ(t(n′)j − u˜(n′)i )
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ}
= Pr
{ 1
n′ − 2
n′−1∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣FnV n|Xn1 (t(n′)j |x1 )−
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X1 (u |x1 )F
(n′)
V n|U˜n
(
t
(n′)
j |u
)
du
∣∣∣∣ ≤ µ
⋂ n′−1∑
j=1
n′∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣F (n′)V n|U˜n (t(n′)j ∣∣∣u˜(n′)i )− Φ(t(n′)j − u˜(n′)i )
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ}
≥ Pr

n′−1∑
j=1
n′∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣F (n′)V n|U˜n (t(n′)j ∣∣∣u˜(n′)i )− Φ(t(n′)j − u˜(n′)i )
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ
−
Pr
 1n′ − 2
n′−1∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣FnV n|Xn1 (t(n′)j |x1 )−
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X1 (u |x1 )F
(n′)
V n|U˜n
(
t
(n′)
j |u
)
du
∣∣∣∣ > µ

where the equality firstly follows the fact that according to t(n
′)
j ∈ U˜ and the definition of F
(n′)
V n|U˜n
(t |u ),
n′−1∑
j=1
n′∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣F (n′)V n|U˜n (t(n′)j ∣∣∣u˜(n′)i )− Φ(t(n′)j − u˜(n′)i )
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ
indicates ∑n′−1
j=1 supu
∣∣∣FV n|U˜n (t(n′)j |u)− Φ(t(n′)j − u)∣∣∣ ≤ δ, combining with another event
1
n′ − 2
n′−1∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣FnV n|Xn1 (t(n′)j |x1 )−
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X1 (u |x1 )F
(n′)
V n|U˜n
(
t
(n′)
j |u
)
du
∣∣∣∣ ≤ µ,
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we have
Dn ≤
1
n′ − 2
n′−1∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣FnV n|Xn1 (t(n′)j |x1)−
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X1 (u |x1 )F
(n′)
V n|U˜n
(
t
(n′)
j |u
)
du
∣∣∣∣
+
1
n′ − 2
n′−1∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∫ +∞−∞ fU|X1 (u |x1 )
(
F
(n′)
V n|U˜n
(tj |u )− Φ
(
t
(n′)
j − u
))
du
∣∣∣∣
< µ+
δ
n′ − 2
= µ′(n′, δ). (70)
Hence, the equality in (70) is established. Upon (70) and lemma 3, the property 2 in theorem 1 is direct.
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